

NSA and NAVY review(s) completed.

DRAFT

Copy 1 of 18

30 December 1957

**JUSTIFICATION FOR ADDING KAMCHATKA PENINSULA
(INCLUDING PETROPAVLOVSK) TO HIGHEST PRIORITY LIST**

1. The KAMCHATKA Peninsula may be used by the Soviets as an ICBM launch site or base for submarines with guided missile capability for attack against North America.

2. Concern that this possibility may be materializing stems from the following:

a. The strategic location of the peninsula, vis-a-vis the North American continent, in terms of proximity and free access to the sea, this peninsula holding a position comparable to that of the KOLA Peninsula in the BARENTS Sea (already covered in part by photography from which revealed four instances of construction of possible missile launch sites).

b. The high sensitivity with which the Russians view the KAMCHATKA area, evidence of this lying in their reactions to ferret flights *and part of submarine penetrations.* as opposed to their reactions to ferret flights in other peripheral areas.

c. The possibilities of guided missile equipped submarines at PETROPAVLOVSK, it being known that at least two with such

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
capability for conversion have been constructed at KOMSOMOLSK and possibly have been converted at PETROPAVLOVSK. Furthermore, there is evidence indicating a considerable strengthening of the KAMCHATKA flotilla by the addition of long range submarines. There is reasonable possibility that at least one of these may be nuclear powered.

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3. It should be noted that previous coverage of a portion of the KAMCHATKA Peninsula, namely, that in the vicinity of KLYUCHI, by



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
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virtue of  Missions 6005 and 6008, 

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 leading to the suspicion that the latter might be an impact point for guided missile testing. Exploitation to date tends to confirm this suspicion although it may be that recoverage of certain areas by larger scale photography at a later date will be rewarding on this point. Recoverage at this time, however, is not urged.

4. A thorough examination of all sources reporting, including low quality photography of PETROPAVLOVSK of 1946 and 1951, on activities in the KAMCHATKA leaves intelligence with a strong suspicion of the possible critical nature of activities on the peninsula but with an inability to assert unequivocally that these suspicions can be disregarded.

45. Attention is called to the fact that in submitting this addition to the highest priority list the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee has not altered its views as of 9 October 1957 with regard to the pre-eminent importance among highest targets of those which bear upon the long range bomber problem (the Navy dissent remaining as stated in that case). It is also noted that except for UKRAINA ^{and Komsomolsk} there is no competition among the  assets for covering this target in the event operations in the Far East are permitted.

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